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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we examine two 
upcoming United States Supreme Court decisions, two recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions, and one recent Florida Supreme 
Court decision. Note One examines Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 and Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education,2 which are two preuniversity level af-
firmative action cases on which the United States Supreme Court re-
cently granted writ of certiorari.3 The Note will attempt to predict 
what action the Supreme Court will take. The second Note also ex-
amines two cases on which the Supreme Court recently granted cer-
tiorari, Gonzales v. Carhart4 and Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America, Inc.,5 which both deal with the contentious is-
                                                                                                                     
 1. 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Jeremy W. Harris contributed this note. 
 4. 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). 
 5. 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006). 
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sue of abortion.6 This Note will also attempt to predict what action 
the Supreme Court will take. 
 We move from the predictive to the descriptive in Note Three, 
which examines Georgia v. Randolph,7 a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning the Fourth Amendment, unreasonable searches, and 
cotenant consent.8 Note Four examines Gonzales v. Oregon,9 where 
the Supreme Court explored the power of the United States Attorney 
General and Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.10 
 Finally, Note Five will move from federal to state law with Engle 
v. Liggett Group, Inc.,11 where the Florida Supreme Court addressed 
punitive damage and class action issues in tobacco litigation.12 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AFFIRMATIVE ACTION—UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT GRANTS WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON TWO 
PREUNIVERSITY LEVEL PUBLIC SCHOOL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS—
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Edu-
cation, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).13 
 On June 5, 2006, the United States Supreme Court agreed to con-
sider two preuniversity level public school affirmative action cases, 
which are to be argued in tandem.14 This is the second time in the 
past three years that the Supreme Court has visited the issue. On 
June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court decided two affirmative action 
cases coming out of the state of Michigan, with one involving the 
University of Michigan15 and the other involving the University of 
Michigan Law School.16 The Court struck down the university’s ac-
tion plan17 and upheld the law school’s plan.18 This Note will focus on 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education by explaining 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Roland Hermida contributed this note. 
 7. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006). 
 8. Andrew Collinson contributed this note. 
 9. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 10. Noah Nadler contributed this note. 
 11. 31 Fla. L. Weekly S464 (Fla. July 6, 2006). 
 12. Rick Engelbright contributed this note. 
 13.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in this case before this issue of the 
Florida State University Law Review went to press. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Se-
attle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding the schools’ use of racial classifica-
tions unconstitutional). 
 14. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); 
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 15. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 16. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 17. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275. 
 18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
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the holdings below and by providing a prediction for what the Su-
preme Court will ultimately decide.  
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1 
 Seattle has never had a judicially imposed desegregation order.19 
A majority of the city’s white students live north of the downtown 
area, while a majority of the city’s nonwhite students live south of 
the downtown area.20 The Seattle School District (District) has volun-
tarily explored various options for ending this de facto segregation 
for over forty years.21 The plan in question (Plan) was implemented 
for the 2001-2002 school year for the District’s ten public schools.22 
The Plan specifically applies to all students entering the high school 
system and seeks to provide choice between the District’s ten schools 
by allowing students to apply to any school within the District.23 If a 
District is “oversubscribed” (meaning there are more applications 
than the school can accommodate), then the District applies a series 
of tiebreakers to determine who the school admits.24 If the student is 
not admitted to the school of his or her choice based on one of the tie-
breakers, the process either begins anew for the student’s second 
choice or the student is placed into the school that is geographically 
closest to the student’s home.25 Five of the ten schools were oversub-
scribed during the school year that this litigation addresses.26 
 When deciding who to admit into an oversubscribed school, the 
District employs four tiebreakers in the following order: (1) if the 
student’s sibling is already a student, the student is admitted; (2) if 
the oversubscribed school is “racially imbalanced,” race is considered; 
(3) the distance between the student’s home and school; and (4) a lot-
tery system. The first and third tiebreakers are determinative in 85-
95% of all cases.27 
 “Racially imbalanced” is defined as 
meaning that the racial make up of [a high school’s] student body 
differs by more than 15 percent from the racial make up of the 
students of the Seattle public schools as a whole—and if the sibling 
preference does not bring the oversubscribed high school within 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 20. Id. at 1166. 
 21. Id. at 1166-67. 
 22. Id. at 1168-69. 
 23. Id. at 1169. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 1169-72. 
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plus or minus 15 percent of the District’s demographics, the race-
based tiebreaker is ‘triggered’ and the race of the applying student 
is considered.28 
 During the school year at issue in the litigation, the race tie-
breaker was used in three of the District’s ten schools to place ap-
proximately 300 of the incoming 3000 students.29 The placement of 
these 300 students affected the racial balance of four of the District’s 
schools by 10-20%.30  
 Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents) is composed of 
parents whose children were negatively affected by the racial tie-
breaker, meaning the children did not receive admission to the school 
of their choice because of the tiebreaker.31 Parents sued the District 
alleging various violations of state and federal law. Most notably, 
Parents alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.32 The district court 
upheld the Plan under both state and federal law.33 A three-judge 
panel for the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court, 
holding that the Plan violated state law.34 The Ninth Circuit with-
drew its opinion and certified the state law question to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, which held that the Plan did not violate state 
law.35 The three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit then held that the 
Plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling state interest.36 The Ninth Circuit 
granted an en banc hearing and affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that the affirmative action plan did not violate state or federal law.37 
 The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s various affirma-
tive action cases, including Grutter v. Bollinger and other educational 
and noneducational cases, in determining whether the Plan violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The Ninth Circuit applied the “strict 
scrutiny standard, which requires that the policy in question be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”39 The Ninth 
Circuit noted that the Grutter court found the societal and educa-
tional benefits of racial diversity to be compelling state interests.40 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 1169-70. 
 29. Id. at 1170. 
 30. Id. at 1170-71. 
 31. Id. at 1171. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 1172. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 1172-79. 
 39. Id. at 1172. 
 40. Id. at 1173. 
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The District asserted two compelling interests in implementing the 
Plan: (1) to obtain the societal and educational benefits of diversity 
and (2) to avoid the harms associated with segregated schools.41  
 The District identified three social and educational benefits of di-
versity in secondary schools. First, the District, through expert wit-
nesses, argued that diversity increases the critical thinking skills of 
white and nonwhite students, allowing them to challenge and under-
stand views that are different from their own.42 Second, the District 
presented evidence concerning the “socialization and citizenship ad-
vantages” of racially diverse schools, which included the “improve-
ment in race-relations, the reduction of prejudicial attitudes, and the 
achievement of a more . . . inclusive experience for all citizens.”43 
Third, the District, using expert witnesses, argued that racially di-
verse schools open “opportunity networks in areas of higher educa-
tion and employment” and lead to students later living in diverse 
neighborhoods and having cross-racial friendships.44 
 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that these interests are very simi-
lar to the interest the law school in Grutter identified and reasoned 
that they were at least as compelling (if not more so) at the secon-
dary school level.45 The Ninth Circuit noted that secondary schools 
serve a unique and important function for transmitting the values of 
our democratic society and that younger people are more amenable to 
the benefits of diversity.46 
 The District claimed it was attempting to avoid racially isolated 
schools, which was a very real possibility considering the racial seg-
regation present in the city’s neighborhoods, because such schools 
would be “characterized by much higher levels of poverty, lower av-
erage test scores, lower levels of student achievement, with less-
qualified teachers and fewer advanced courses.”47 The Ninth Circuit 
believed that curing de facto segregation, which is segregation that is 
not caused by the intentional acts of the government, was a legiti-
mate compelling state interest.48 
 The Ninth Circuit found that the Plan was narrowly tailored to these 
compelling state interests.49 However, this discussion is unimportant to 
the prediction that follows and therefore will not be discussed. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 1174. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1174-75. 
 44. Id. at 1175. 
 45. Id. at 1175-76. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 1177. 
 48. Id. at 1178-79. 
 49. Id. at 1192-92. 
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MEREDITH V. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 In 1975, a federal court imposed a desegregation order on the Jef-
ferson County Public School Board (Board).50 This order was a result 
of two federal lawsuits that alleged that the Board maintained a seg-
regated school system.51 The Board employed various programs over 
the next twenty-five years with the purpose of maintaining desegre-
gated schools.52 As the result of a 1999 lawsuit, this order was dis-
solved in 2000, and the Board was ordered to discontinue racial quo-
tas at the school in question.53  However, the Board believed that this 
court order was limited in nature and therefore adopted the 2001 
Student Assignment Plan (2001 Plan).54  
 The 2001 Plan contains three basic organizing principles: (1) 
management of broad racial guidelines, (2) creation of school 
boundaries or “resides” areas and elementary school clusters, and 
(3) maximization of student choice through magnet schools, mag-
net traditional schools, magnet and optional programs, open en-
rollment and transfers. Using these principles, [the Board] pro-
vides a form of managed choice in student assignment for its stu-
dents individually and for the system as a whole.55 
The 2001 Plan requires that each school seek a black enrollment of 
no less than 15% and no more than 50%.56 Race is only considered af-
ter a range of other factors, such as “place of residence, school capac-
ity, program popularity, random draw and the nature of the student’s 
choices.”57 Race can, and does, determine whether a black or white 
student receives his or her school of choice.58 
 Each school has a designated geographic attendance area, which 
is called its “reside area.”59 Students are then assigned a “resides 
school” based on their address.60 A majority of elementary school 
students and middle school students and just under a majority of 
high school students attend their resides school.61 Students are al-
                                                                                                                     
 50. McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (W.D. Ky. 
2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 51. Id. at 841. 
 52. Id. at 841-42. 
 53. Id. at 841. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 842. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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lowed to apply to several specialized and magnet schools outside of 
their resides area.62 
 The plaintiffs were parents of children who obtained dissatisfac-
tory results with the 2001 Plan and, therefore, were seeking to enjoin 
the use of the 2001 Plan as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 The district court upheld the 2001 
Plan,64 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in a 
per curiam opinion.65 
 The district court applied the same strict scrutiny analysis util-
ized in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1 in determining whether the 2001 Plan was constitu-
tional.66 The Board articulated the following as the benefits of the 
2001 Plan: “(1) a better academic education for all students; (2) bet-
ter appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; 
(3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader 
community support for all [Board] schools.”67 Once again, these in-
terests were very similar to the asserted interests in Grutter.68 The 
Board also believed the 2001 Plan improved the education of all stu-
dents and improved the system as a whole by “creating a system of 
roughly equal components, not one urban system and another subur-
ban system, not one rich and another poor, not one Black and an-
other White.”69 The district court held that the 2001 Plan was nar-
rowly tailored to these interests.70 
WHAT WILL THE SUPREME COURT DO? 
 These two cases, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education, are to be argued in tandem. The striking similarity they 
share may provide an insight for what will ultimately happen. Nei-
ther affirmative action plan seeks to cure de jure segregation, which 
is segregation caused by intentional acts of the government. Instead, 
both plans are aimed at curing de facto segregation, which is segre-
gation that happens without the intentional acts of the government. 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 836-38. 
 64. Id. at 837. The district court did strike part of the plan as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause because it unnecessarily separated students into racial categories. Id. at 
837. This portion of the 2001 Plan will not be discussed any further in this Note. 
 65. McFarland v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 66. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.  
 67. Id. at 850. 
 68. Id. at 850. 
 69. Id. at 853-54. 
 70. Id. at 855-56. Once again, this discussion is not relevant to this Note and will not 
be discussed further. 
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The Seattle School District has never had a judicially imposed deci-
sion attempting to cure de jure segregation,71 and the Jefferson 
County Board of Education had been released from the federal order 
attempting to cure its past intentional discrimination.72 The Supreme 
Court has endorsed only two compelling state interests in the public 
education context.73 First, “the Court has allowed racial classifica-
tions to remedy past racial imbalances in schools resulting from past 
de jure segregation. Second, the Court has allowed undergraduate 
and graduate universities to consider race as part of an overall, flexi-
ble assessment of an individual’s characteristics to attain student 
body diversity.”74 The crucial question presented to the Supreme 
Court is whether an affirmative action plan beneath the univer-
sity level can be validated by the second interest, which is “stu-
dent body diversity.”   
 The dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 may offer helpful insight in determining how 
the Supreme Court will answer this question. The dissent first points 
out that although the majority talks of “segregation,” it is really ad-
dressing de facto segregation.75 The dissent notes that the use of ra-
cial classifications is only permissible to cure de jure segregation.76 
According to the dissent, the majority uses this rhetorical ploy be-
cause if it is not curing de jure segregation, then it is engaging in 
racial balancing, which the Supreme Court has explicitly held 
unconstitutional.77 
 The dissent does not believe the interests asserted by the District 
are valid under Grutter because “[t]he Grutter ‘diversity’ interest fo-
cuses upon the individual, of which race plays a part, but not the 
whole. The District’s asserted interest, however, focuses only upon 
race, running afoul of equal protection’s focus upon the individual.”78 
The majority counters that these differences are unimportant be-
cause “context matters.”79 The dissent, unconvinced, argues that con-
text does not make a plan that focuses solely on race constitutional, 
especially in light of the Grutter opinion, which allows race to be 
merely a factor or a plus in the admissions process.80  
                                                                                                                     
 71. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 
(9th Cir. 2005), cert granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006). 
 72. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42. 
 73. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 426 F.3d at 1200-01 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 1200-01 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1197. 
 76. Id. at 1197 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). 
 77. Id. at 1197-98 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)). 
 78. Id. at 1201-02. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 1202-03. 
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 Furthermore, the dissent doubts the validity of the sociological 
evidence presented by the District in support of its asserted interests 
and contends that the evidence relies heavily on racial stereotypes, 
such as the notion that a heavily white school is better than a heavily 
minority school.81 The majority, much like the majority in Grutter, 
gives great deference to the government on this issue.82 However, the 
dissent does not believe the deference was warranted because of the 
difference in the “context.”83 The Grutter court granted such defer-
ence largely based on the First Amendment and “academic freedom” 
interest present at the postsecondary school level.84 Secondary 
schools, however, lack this notion of academic freedom.85 The dissent 
also believes the benefits of diversity are more important at a post-
secondary level where the schoolroom experience expands beyond the 
classroom into the dormitories and the like and where the Socratic 
method of teaching is employed.86 
 Although the Supreme Court could decide literally anything with 
these two cases, the most plausible outcomes are that (1) it embraces 
both of these cases and allows racial classifications to be used for 
more than just curing de jure segregation at the preuniversity level 
or (2) it embraces a position similar to the dissent in Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and 
holds that preuniversity racial classifications can only be justified as 
an attempt to cure de jure or intentional segregation. With the cur-
rent make-up of the Supreme Court, the second option seems far 
more likely.87 
 When the Grutter and Gratz decisions were decided, Sandra Day 
O’Connor was still a member of the Court. In fact, Justice O’Connor 
wrote the Grutter opinion and was in the majority for both opinions. 
Grutter was a 5-4 split, with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg joining O’Connor in the majority.88 The main dissent—
composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas—believed that the law school’s program was nothing 
more than an attempt to achieve racial balancing.89 The main dissent 
further argued that far too much deference was granted to the law 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at 1203-08. 
 82. Id. at 1207. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 1207-08. 
 87. The Supreme Court’s current make-up also suggests that the Supreme Court 
might overrule Grutter altogether. While this is a very real possibility, it seems unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would choose preuniversity level cases to overrule a postsecondary 
level decision. 
 88. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 396, 311 (2003). 
 89. Id. at 378-79. 
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school and that the strict scrutiny analysis was far too weak.90 Gratz 
amounted to a 6-3 decision to strike down the university’s affirmative 
action plan with Rehnquist penning the majority that was joined by 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.91 O’Connor wrote a concur-
ring opinion that was joined in part by Breyer, which gave the major-
ity the sixth vote to strike down the plan.92 Souter, Stevens, and 
Ginsburg all dissented through several disjointed opinions.93 The ma-
jority held that the university’s policy, “which automatically distrib-
utes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admis-
sion, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely be-
cause of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in edu-
cational diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”94 
 Rehnquist and O’Connor have now been replaced by Chief Justice 
John Roberts and by Justice Samuel Alito. Both are widely believed 
to be hostile to affirmative action. Roberts was criticized during his 
confirmation hearings for a memorandum he wrote during his tenure 
with the Reagan White House which suggested that affirmative ac-
tion programs in favor of women may be “unconstitutional”95 and for 
his work to limit court-imposed busing orders.96 Roberts, as a private 
practitioner, represented “clients opposed to government affirmative 
action programs.”97 In fairness, these were not necessarily his own 
personal views, as he was always acting as counsel for another per-
son or entity when putting forth these positions. Justice Alito has a 
similar background of working for the Reagan Administration 
against affirmative action, assisting in three major cases that 
reached the United States Supreme Court on the issue, and he has 
attested in writing that he personally believes in the legal positions 
he advocated in this regard.98 As a judge, both times that a white 
plaintiff or plaintiffs challenged an affirmative action plan that fa-
vored minorities, he sided with the white plaintiff(s).99 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 380-87. 
 91. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003). 
 92. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 282-303. 
 94. Id. at 270. 
 95. Roberts Knocked Affirmative Action, CBS NEWS, Aug. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/18/supremecourt/main786870.shtml. 
 96. Civil Rights Groups Cite Concerns Over Roberts, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2005, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/07/22/civil_rights_ 
groups_cite_concerns_over_roberts/. 
 97. Id. 
 98. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE 
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 12-15 (2005), 
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/alito/Report_on_the_Nomination_of_ 
Judge_Samuel_A._Alito,_Jr._to_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 24-26. 
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 Roberts and Alito both pledged to take due account of stare decisis 
during their confirmation hearings.100 However, striking down the 
two affirmative action plans at issue could be done without overrul-
ing Grutter or Gratz by simply distinguishing between secondary and 
postsecondary education. In any event, these two cases will be crucial 
in both defining the judicial philosophies of these new justices and in 
shaping the composite of American schools. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ABORTION—UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
GRANTS WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON TWO ABORTION CASES—Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006).101 
 Once again, the issue of abortion is before the Supreme Court.102 
The Court granted writ of certiorari on two cases involving the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003.103 Both cases involved suits against 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales challenging the constitutional-
ity of the Act as passed by Congress.104 
GONZALES V. CARHART 
 In petitioning for writ of certiorari, the government asserted that 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 invalid.105 More specifically, the govern-
ment stated that the court of appeals erred in finding the Act invalid 
by failing to give substantial deference to findings made by Congress, 
concluding that partial-birth abortions are “never medically indi-
cated to preserve the health of the mother.”106 The Act as proposed by 
Congress prohibits physicians from conducting partial-birth abor-
tions.107 The partial-birth abortions referred to in the statue describes 
an abortion procedure performed late in the pregnancy term known 
as dilation and extraction (D & X) or dilation and evacuation (D & E).  
 In drafting the statute, Congress provided an exception to the Act 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Abortion, Race on Court’s Agenda; Observers Are Watching for a Rightward Lean 
that Could Affect Previous Decisions, Including One in a Nebraska Case, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Oct. 2, 2006, at 4A.  
 101.  The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in this decision before this issue of the 
Florida State University Law Review went to press. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 
(2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
 102. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006); Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood 
Fed’n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006). 
 103. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1531). 
 104. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-24, Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (No. 05-380). 
 106. Id. at 11 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Cmm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 
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for mothers who required the procedure to save their lives.108 How-
ever, no exception was provided for protecting the health of the 
mother.109 In omitting the health exception from the statute, Con-
gress relied on findings derived from written and oral testimony on 
the subject.110 The testimony began in 1995 with Congress holding 
hearings and debates on proposals to end partial-birth abortions. Ac-
cording to Congress, the common finding among the experts testify-
ing was that partial abortion was never necessary to preserve the 
health of the mother and instead was actually quite dangerous. Con-
gress passed bills invalidating partial-birth abortions in 1996 and 
1997, but President Clinton vetoed both.111 Despite the failure of 
those two bills, more than thirty states enacted statutes banning 
partial-birth abortions.112 
 The precedent used by the Eighth Circuit to invalidate the Act 
arose in the Supreme Court case of Stenberg v. Carhart.113 In Sten-
berg, the Supreme Court examined the validity of a Nebraska statute 
forbidding the use of partial-birth abortions.114 Like the Act at issue, 
the Nebraska statute contained a provision allowing partial-birth 
abortions when necessary to preserve the life of the mother. How-
ever, no such exception was provided for the health of the mother. 
Citing the absence of a health exception, the Court found the statute 
unconstitutional.115 The majority in Stenberg found that a health ex-
ception was required when “substantial medical authority” supports 
the medical necessity of a procedure.116  
 The second reason the Court invalidated the Nebraska Statute 
was because of the extent of its ban—that is, its abolishment of not 
only the D & X procedure but also the D & E procedure created an 
undue burden on a woman’s access to an abortion.117 Under the 
Court’s reasoning, an undue burden exists, and therefore a provision 
of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus 
attains viability.118 
 Three years after the ruling in Stenberg, Congress passed the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. The Act reflected Congress’s at-
tempt to write an effective partial-birth abortion ban by curing the 
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deficiencies identified by the Supreme Court in the Nebraska Statute 
in Sternberg. In doing so, Congress took additional measures in writ-
ing the statute to ensure that it would survive any challenge. The 
first modification came with a more specific definition of partial-birth 
abortion. Under the Act, partial-birth abortion is defined as  
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion (A) delib-
erately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in 
the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is out-
side the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, 
any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and (B) per-
forms the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills 
the partially delivered living fetus.119 
 More importantly for the issue at hand, in drafting the Act, Con-
gress also relied on extensive findings on the medical necessity of 
partial-birth abortion.120 Based on these findings, Congress concluded 
that partial-birth abortion is never medically necessary to preserve 
the health of the mother. Although such findings directly conflict 
with those made by the Court in Stenberg, Congress contends that its 
based its decision on different facts.121 Therefore, no such exception 
exists in the Act as presented by Congress. 
 As discussed above, before the Act was passed into law, four phy-
sicians sought a permanent injunction of the Act, giving rise to the 
present action. The district court granted the injunction.122 The court 
found the Act was invalid based on its lack of a health exception and 
its inclusion of both D & E and D & X abortions.123 As to the former 
issue, the government cited the Turner cases in arguing that Con-
gress’s findings regarding the medical necessity of partial-birth abor-
tions are owed binding deference.124 The government argued that the 
court’s application of the “substantial medical authority” standard 
from Stenberg was directly inconsistent with the rule stated in the 
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Turner cases. The government explained that the proper application 
of the Stenberg standard is in the absence of congressional findings 
on the issue. The district court agreed with the government that con-
gressional findings are due binding deference. However, the court 
said such deference is only required when specific circumstances ex-
ist—that is, when “the legislative conclusion was reasonable and 
supported by substantial evidence.”125  
 In rejecting the government’s contention and affirming the district 
court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit stated that the government mis-
takenly believed that the “substantial medical authority” standard 
was a question of fact.126  The court explained that where the ques-
tion at issue is one asking “whether there is a certain quantum of 
evidence to support a particular answer,” it is usually treated as a 
matter of law.127 Thus, the court found the government’s argument 
for deference under Turner was irrelevant.  
 In so finding, the court held that the ruling in Stenberg is a per se 
constitutional rule.128 The court reasoned that in Stenberg, the Su-
preme Court was provided with all available medical evidence on the 
issue partial-birth abortions.129 Using that information, the Court 
found that “substantial medical authority” indicated a need for a 
health exception and stated that “[n]either we, nor Congress, are free 
to disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination because the 
Court’s conclusions are final on matters of constitutional law.”130 The 
Eighth Circuit did not go so far as to state that the Court’s findings 
were forever conclusive on the issue. Rather, the court conceded the 
rapid development of medical technology and knowledge could render 
the Court’s finding in 2000 obsolete down the road.  
 In applying such reasoning to the facts before them, the Eighth 
Circuit looked to whether the government provided sufficient evi-
dence to find that “substantial medical authority” no longer supports 
the Court’s finding in Stenberg.131 Thus, the court looked to the Sten-
berg court’s evidentiary circumstances upon which it based its ruling. 
Such circumstances consisted of the conclusion that the D & X proce-
dure “significantly obviates health risks in certain circumstances” 
and that there exists a “division of opinion among medical experts 
regarding the procedure . . . and an absence of controlled medical 
studies that address the safety and medical necessity of the banned 
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procedures.”132 The court found that government’s evidence was not 
sufficient to distinguish the evidence relied on in Stenberg.133 There-
fore, the court held the government’s reliance on such evidence in ex-
cluding a health exception from the Act was misplaced and the Act 
was unconstitutional. Upon reaching the conclusion that the lack of 
the health exception rendered the Act unconstitutional, the court de-
cided that there was no need to address the district court’s finding that 
the Act imposed an undue burden on women seeking an abortion.134 
 With the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s deci-
sion, the government petitioned the Supreme Court.135 In petitioning 
for writ of certiorari, the government advanced two primary reasons 
why the Court should hear its appeal: the Eighth Circuit (1) invali-
dated an act of Congress and (2) failed to follow the Court’s precedent 
by not deferring to congressional findings.136 Under the first reason, 
the government simply argued that the importance of an act of Con-
gress alone requires that the Supreme Court grant writ of certio-
rari.137 The second reason advanced by the government is the same it 
argued to the court of appeals regarding the deference due to con-
gressional findings.138 Again, the government pointed to the rulings 
in the Turner cases in arguing that the findings of Congress are 
owed deference and that the Eighth Circuit’s failure to give such 
deference constituted error. The Court granted writ of certiorari 
on February 21, 2006.  
GONZALES V. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA., INC. 
 Following in the footsteps of Gonzales v. Carhart is Gonzales v. 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.139 Like the four phy-
sicians in Carhart, Planned Parenthood also challenged the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act in 2003. Also like the physicians in Carhart, 
Planned Parenthood wasted no time in bringing its challenge.140 Be-
fore the ink denoting President George W. Bush’s signature on the 
Act could dry, it challenged the Act under the Fifth Amendment. In 
doing so, it asserted four reasons why the Act was facially invalid: (1) 
the Act places an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose 
whether or not to have an abortion, (2) it does not contain a health 
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exception, (3) the language of the Act is unconstitutionally vague, 
and (4) the Act violates a woman’s due process right to bodily integ-
rity.141 The district court agreed and found the statute invalid for the 
first three reasons asserted by Planned Parenthood.142 The district 
court explained that the Act created an undue burden by broadly de-
fining the procedures prohibited under the Act.143 Thus, because the 
procedures prohibited encompassed almost all post-first trimester 
abortions, the district court found the Act “placed a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of abortion-seekers.”144 Further, the district court’s 
finding that the Act was vague stemmed from the use of a number of 
terms and phrases which would fail to provide notice to physicians 
that performing certain procedures would violate the Act.145 Finally, 
the district court found the Act unconstitutional because it lacked a 
health exception as required by Stenberg.146  
 Once again, the government advanced the argument that Con-
gress based the Act on factual findings it conducted over several 
years. Thus, because they are congressional findings, they are owed 
deference. In laying out the district court’s decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit also noted similar findings in other federal courts.147 The court of 
appeals cited three courts all holding the Act unconstitutional.148 The 
first cited the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Carhart v. Gonzales and 
the district court’s findings in that case as outlined above. The court 
also pointed to the Southern District of New York case National 
Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,149 which invalidated the Act because 
of its lack of a health exception. 
 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling for the same 
three reasons: (1) the lack of a health exception, (2) the imposition of 
an undue burden on women seeking an abortion, and (3) the Act’s 
vague language. In explaining its finding that the Act’s lack of a 
health exception rendered it unconstitutional, the court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg that abortion regulations re-
quire a health exception when it may be necessary to preserve a 
woman’s life.150 The court continued to explain that the Sternberg rul-
ing held that the absence of a health exception was unconstitutional 
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unless there is “medical consensus that no circumstances exist in 
which the procedure would be necessary to preserve a woman’s 
health.”151 In defining “medical consensus,” the court stated that 
complete unanimity was unnecessary. Rather, consensus exists when 
there is “no significant disagreement” regarding the issue within the 
medical community.152 Thus, the relevant question identified by the 
Ninth Circuit was whether Congress properly concluded that there 
was consensus in the medical community that partial-birth abortions 
are never necessary to preserve the health of the mother.153 However, 
the court of appeals acknowledged that in answering that question, 
the court must resolve an important issue: how much deference to 
give to the legislative findings relied on in passing the Act.154 Once 
again, the government argued that that the line of Turner Broadcast-
ing System cases should rule on the issue.155 Specifically, the Turner 
standard held that when reviewing the facts upon which the consti-
tutionality of a statute is based, a court must find that Congress 
based its “reasonable inferences” on “substantial evidence.”156  
 In laying the foundation for its ultimate rejection of the govern-
ment’s argument, the court first addressed the lack of certainty 
stemming from the Supreme Court’s decisions on what level of defer-
ence to afford congressional findings.157 In furtherance of its point, 
the Ninth Circuit cited cases where congressional findings were 
given different levels of deference.158 However, the court found that 
deciding what level of deference to afford the congressional findings 
relied on in passing the Act was a question it need not answer. In-
stead, the court stated that regardless of the level of deference, the 
congressional findings at issue clearly show that no consensus exists 
in the medical community that partial-birth abortion is never neces-
sary.159 Therefore, while the court ultimately dodged the deference 
question, it did not pass up the opportunity to suggest that it would 
not find in favor of the government. Thus, in finding a lack of medical 
consensus in Congress’s factual record, the court held that the health 
exception must be included.160 
 Along with the lack of the health exception, the Ninth Circuit 
went on to find the Act also failed by posing an undue burden on 
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women seeking an abortion. In so finding, the court cited Congress’s 
deliberate choice to create a broad prohibition of abortion proce-
dures.161 Congress achieved the broad prohibition, the court ex-
plained, by defining the banned procedure in a way that excludes 
both intact and nonintact D & E abortions.162 Thus, like the Ne-
braska statute in Stenberg, the court found the Act posed an undue 
burden on women seeking an abortion.163  
 In response, the government pointed to three distinct differences 
between the Act and the Nebraska statute ruled invalid in Sten-
berg.164 The government first argued that unlike the Nebraska stat-
ute, the Act applies only when the fetus is delivered outside the body 
of the mother. Because of that distinction, the government suggested, 
the Act does not apply to nonintact D & E.165 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed. Although the court noted the change in verbiage from Ne-
braska statute to the Act, it found the result of the language re-
mained the same166—that is, the Act excludes both intact and nonin-
tact D & E’s. For its second reason, the government argued that the 
language limiting the banned abortion to those where either the “en-
tire fetal head” or “any part of the fetal trunk past the navel” is de-
livered for the purpose of abortion.167 Once again, the court disagreed. 
Again, despite the change in the language used in the Act, the court 
found the application remained the same.168 Finally, the third reason 
advanced by the government why the Act differed from the Nebraska 
statute centered upon the intent required by the physician.169 The 
government argued that the insertion of the phrase “overt act” in the 
intent language of the statute clearly established that the Act does 
not apply as broadly to other abortion procedures like the Nebraska 
statute.170 However, the court again found the government’s argu-
ment less than compelling. Thus, the court found the Act, like the 
statute in Stenberg, created a “substantial obstacle” for women seek-
ing an abortion.171 
 Finally, the court addressed the issue regarding the language of 
the Act being unconstitutionally vague.172 The court explained that 
the vagueness creates havoc by failing to clearly define the prohib-
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ited medical procedures.173 That failure, the court explained, “de-
prive[s] doctors of fair notice and encourag[es] arbitrary enforce-
ment.”174 While the court acknowledged that it could construe the Act 
to cover both forms of D & E abortions, it decided it would cause too 
many problems for the physicians trying to decide which procedures 
it permits or prohibits.175 For that reason, the court found the Act un-
constitutionally vague. Specifically, the court pointed to the govern-
ment’s use of the terms “partial–birth abortion,” “overt act,” and “liv-
ing fetus” as terms causing the most confusion.176 The court stated 
that the government’s failure to define “partial-birth abortion” using 
clinical terms to define the scope of the procedures encompassed by 
the acts prohibition would cause too many problems for physicians 
trying to comply with the Act.177  
 As for “overt act,” the government argued that the term has been 
used numerous times in federal statutes. However, the court found 
that its particular use here was vague. The court explained that term 
used in conjunction with the phrase “overt act, other than completion 
of delivery” could include a range of acts involved in abortion proce-
dures.178 Therefore, the court found the language did “not provide the 
definitiveness about the statute’s scope.”179 
 In upholding the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit made 
clear that its decision was not based solely on the lack of a health ex-
ception.180 As evidenced by its opinion, the court also found that it 
imposes an undue burden on women seeking abortions and is un-
constitutionally vague.181 
 In petitioning for writ of certiorari, the government seems content 
with attacking the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s decisions that the ab-
sence of a health exception rendered the Act unconstitutional. De-
spite acknowledging the two other grounds upon which the Ninth 
Circuit rested its opinion, the government is willing to consolidate 
the two cases. However, the government has argued that while the 
Eighth Circuit did not review the other two grounds, the Supreme 
Court could address them as well as the necessity of a health excep-
tion. Despite the change in faces on the panel since Stenberg, it 
seems unlikely that the Court is ready to overrule its decision in that 
case and uphold the Act as written. It is possible that the govern-
ment could earn a small victory based on the law as stated in the 
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Turner cases and have the case remanded. However, it is far from 
clear that the congressional findings will stand up against scrutiny 
even if the binding deference standard is applied. That is, the gov-
ernment may have a hard time proving that the findings are as con-
clusive on the issue as it believes.  
 Regardless of whether the Court would “like” to pass such a pro-
hibition on these abortion procedures, the Act as written may be too 
flawed to save. As outlined by the Ninth Circuit, there are numerous 
problems with the statute. Thus, even if a majority of the Court de-
sires to validate this Act, Congress did not put them in a good situa-
tion to do so. Therefore, for the Court to come out and remedy the en-
tire Act would be quite a statement. It is a statement that it is not 
likely willing to make at this point in time. However, it is possible 
that even an affirmation of the circuit courts’ decisions could provide 
a more definite outline of what a proper abortion act should look like. 
If the Court wants to ultimately see such a statute passed, look for a 
detailed description of what Congress may do with its findings. What 
is guaranteed is that if the Act is held invalid, it will not be the last 
abortion-ban legislation. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—A PHYSICALLY PRESENT INHABITANT'S 
EXPRESS REFUSAL OF CONSENT TO A POLICE SEARCH IS DISPOSITIVE 
AS TO HIM, REGARDLESS OF THE CONSENT OF A FELLOW OCCUPANT, 
MAKING A SEARCH UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT—Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006). 
 Respondent, Scott Randolph, claimed the police violated his 
Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches because (1) 
they entered his home without a search warrant and (2) although his 
wife consented to the search, he explicitly did not.182 Randolph’s mo-
tion to suppress evidence of his cocaine use that was seized during 
the search was denied by the trial court, but the Supreme Court of 
Georgia sustained a reversal of the denial.183 On appeal by the State 
of Georgia, the United States Supreme Court affirmed and found 
that one occupant may not give effective consent to search shared 
premises against a cotenant who is present and refuses the search.184 
 On the morning of July 6, 2001, Respondent’s wife complained to 
the police that after a domestic dispute Respondent had taken their 
son away from her.185 When the police arrived at the house, Respon-
dent’s wife told them that Respondent was a cocaine user.186 Shortly 
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after the police arrived, Respondent returned home and explained 
that he had moved his son to a neighbor’s house out of concern that 
his wife might try to leave town with him.187 He denied that he was a 
cocaine user and claimed that it was, in fact, his wife who abused 
drugs and alcohol.188 
 After the couple’s son was returned home by the police, Respon-
dent’s wife persisted in her complaints about her husband’s drug 
abuse and offered that there were “items of drug evidence” in the 
house.189 The police sergeant asked Respondent for permission to 
search the house and Respondent unequivocally refused.190 
 The sergeant then asked Respondent’s wife for consent to search 
and she readily agreed.191 Respondent’s wife then led the police into 
the house and upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as being the 
Respondent’s.192 The police noticed a portion of a drinking straw with 
a powdery substance he suspected was cocaine.193 The sergeant left 
the house to retrieve an evidence bag from his car and to call the dis-
trict attorney’s office, which instructed him to stop the search until 
he obtained a warrant.194 The police took the Randolphs and the 
straw to the police station and awaited the warrant.195 Upon the is-
suance of the search warrant, the police returned to the house and 
seized further evidence of drug use.196 
 Respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the police 
on the basis that it was product of a warrantless search of his house 
disallowed by his express refusal, despite his wife’s consent.197 The 
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Respondent’s wife had 
common authority to consent to the search.198 
 The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, and its holding was 
sustained by the Georgia Supreme Court on the reasoning that, “the 
consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one 
occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant 
who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless 
search.”199 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether one occupant may give effective consent to search shared 
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premises against the interests of a cotenant who is present at the 
time and refuses to consent to the search.200 
 In deciding this case, the majority distinguished the facts of 
Randolph from the Court’s earlier ruling in United States v. Matlock, 
which recognized the validity of searches with the voluntary consent 
of a fellow occupant who shared common authority over property 
when the suspect was absent.201 To do this, the Court evaluated the 
source of the co-occupant consent rule recognized by Matlock. In its 
evaluation, the Court found, “the constant element in assessing 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the 
great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which 
are . . . influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its 
rules.”202 In Matlock, the social expectation was that a co-inhabitant 
could consent to a search of a shared premises because that co-
inhabitant had common authority over the premises.203  
 Sixteen years after Matlock, the Court revisited the issue of social 
expectation and approached the issue raised by Respondent when it 
held in Minnesota v. Olson that overnight houseguests have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters.204 Therefore, 
the Court determined that, “[i]f that customary expectation of cour-
tesy or deference is a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights of a 
houseguest, it presumably should follow that an inhabitant of shared 
premises may claim at least as much . . . .”205 In assessing the rela-
tive privacy rights of cotenants, the Court looked to property law to 
assess the strength of a cotenant’s rights and determined that each 
cotenant has an equal right.206 Thus, wrote the Court, “[s]ince the co-
tenant . . . has no recognized authority in law or social practice to 
prevail over a present and objecting tenant, his disputed invitation . . . 
gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering 
than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”207 
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 The majority, in reaching its decision, made clear that its ruling 
was a narrow one limited to the facts of the case.208 To the Court, “if a 
potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the 
door and objects, the cotenant’s permission does not suffice for a rea-
sonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not in-
vited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.”209 In the ma-
jority opinion, the reason for this distinction was “the practical value” 
in the clarity of two rules: one valuing a cotenant’s permission in the 
absence of his cotenant, the other valuing a cotenant’s right to refuse 
consent to search.210 
 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized that the decision 
by the Court was limited to the facts of the case and evaluated the 
facts not on social expectations or property rights, but on the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections against “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.”211 Breyer noted that the Court measures reasonableness “by 
examining the totality of the circumstances.”212 Looking at the cir-
cumstances of the case, Breyer found the search to be unreason-
able.213 Here, the search was solely for evidence and the officers had 
not justified their search by trying to prevent possible evidence de-
struction.214 Additionally, the police could have secured the home 
while awaiting a valid search warrant.215 To Breyer, such circum-
stances were insufficient to “justify abandoning the Fourth Amend-
ment’s traditional hostility to police entry into a home without a 
warrant.”216 If the circumstances were different, however, Breyer 
would have changed his vote.217 Were the objector not present or if 
there was a risk of an ongoing crime in the house (such as domestic 
violence), there would be special reason for the police to enter.218 
 The principle dissent by Chief Justice Roberts criticized the ma-
jority’s approach, finding that it randomly protects co-occupants who 
happen to be at the front door, while affording no protection to co-
occupants who might be sleeping or watching television.219 Roberts 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 1527. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. The Court made clear that it would be impermissible for the police to remove a 
potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the purpose of dodging a denial of con-
sent. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1529-30 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 212. Id. at 1529 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). 
 213. Id. at 1530. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. Breyer places special emphasis on the need for the police to immediately inter-
vene in the case of domestic violence, despite the direct objection of a cotenant, and makes 
clear that the Court’s decision will not hamper such law enforcement action. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In United States v. Matlock, the Court 
found no violation when police arrested defendant in the front yard of his house and placed 
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expressed his fear that such a random protection could protect the 
nonconsenting abuser from a search of his home, though the abused 
spouse would likely give consent to such a search.220 To Roberts, the 
correct approach to deciding this case was to find that “[i]f an indi-
vidual shares information, papers, or places with another, he as-
sumes the risk that the other person will . . . share access . . . with 
the government.”221 Roberts pointed out that the Court had previ-
ously decided that co-occupants have “assumed the risk that one of 
their number might permit [a] common area to be searched.”222 
 Roberts further disagreed with the majority’s focus on assessing 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in light of social expectations.223 
In Roberts’ view, the problem with this assessment was that what 
the Constitution protects is privacy, not social expectations.224 Rob-
erts wrote, “Our common social expectations may well be that the 
other person will not . . . share what we have shared with them with 
another—including the police—but that is the risk we take in shar-
ing.”225 Though many social conventions shape how one acts when 
given access to private information, Roberts argued, “[t]he Constitu-
tion . . . protects not these but privacy, and once privacy has been 
shared, the shared information, documents, or places remain private 
only at the discretion of the confidant.”226 Thus, Roberts would have 
the Court recognize that “a decision to share a private place, like a 
decision to share a secret or confidential document, necessarily en-
tails the risk that those with whom we share may . . . choose to share 
. . . with the police.”227 
 In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas noted that the Court should 
have decided the case relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire.228 In 
Coolidge, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment search occurs 
where the spouse of a suspect voluntarily leads the police to potential 
evidence of wrongdoing.229 The foundation for Coolidge came from 
Burdeau v. McDowell,230 in which the Court ruled that only the ac-
                                                                                                                     
him in a patrol car before obtaining permission to search a shared bedroom for evidence of 
a bank robbery. 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court similarly 
found no violation when defendant was actually asleep in the apartment when police ob-
tained consent to search from cotenant. 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990). 
 220. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)) (alteration in 
original). 
 223. Id. at 1533. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1539. 
 228. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 229. Id. at 486-90. 
 230. 256 U.S. 465 (1921). 
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tions of an agent of the government constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the Amendment “was in-
tended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and 
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental 
agencies.”231 Believing that the facts of this case were substantially 
the same, Thomas believed that Coolidge was controlling and, since 
Mrs. Randolph was not an agent of the state, there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation.232 
 The majority, for its part, responded to Thomas’ dissent by recog-
nizing a cotenant’s possible interest in reporting criminal activity in 
an attempt to deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a 
criminal or for other reasons.233 The majority believed, however, that 
society could have the benefit of these interests “without relying on a 
theory of consent that ignores an inhabitant’s refusal to allow a war-
rantless search.”234 Thus, a cotenant could turn evidence over to the 
police on his own initiative and circumvent problems arising from 
this ruling.235 Furthermore, the majority expressed its view that this 
case had no bearing on the ability of the police to protect victims of 
domestic violence.236 To emphasize this point, the majority wrote, 
“the question whether the police might lawfully enter over objection 
in order to provide any protection that might be reasonable is easily 
answered yes.”237 Thus, as the majority readily points out, the hold-
ing in Randolph is exceedingly narrow and applies only to cases with 
exactly the same set of facts.238 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOES NOT HAVE 
THE POWER TO IMPOSE AN INTERPRETIVE RULE ON THE GENERAL 
MEDICAL PRACTICES WHICH ARE MEANT TO BE GOVERNED BY STATE 
LAW—Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 The State of Oregon and a group of Oregon residents sued the 
United States Attorney General to challenge an interpretive ruling of 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).239 The rule, known as the “Ash-
croft Directive,” held that medically assisted suicide through the use 
of federally controlled substances violated the CSA and that the Ore-
gon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) was not a “legitimate medical 
                                                                                                                     
 231. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Burdeau, 256 U.S. 
at 475). 
 232. Id. at 1542. 
 233. Id. at 1524 (majority opinion). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1525. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1527. 
 239. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 907 (2006). 
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purpose.”240 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld invalidation 
of the Ashcroft Directive by ruling that making a medical procedure 
authorized under state law a federal crime created an imbalance be-
tween state and federal law that was not authorized by the CSA.241 
On appeal by the Attorney General, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the holding that the CSA was in direct conflict with 
the ODWDA.242 
 In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize assisted suicide 
when the state’s voters passed the ODWDA.243 The law protected 
physicians who followed certain procedural safeguards from civil li-
ability when they dispensed or prescribed lethal drugs to patients 
who were terminally ill.244 The Oregon law required (1) the patient to 
obtain a medical judgment that he or she would die within six 
months, (2) the physician to determine whether the decision made by 
the patient was an informed decision that was not influenced by any 
outside source, (3) the patient to consult a second physician who 
must examine the patient and the medical records to confirm the 
findings of the original physician, and (4) the prescribing physician to 
not administer the lethal dose.245 
 Enacted in 1970, the CSA’s main objective was to combat drug 
abuse and control the trafficking of controlled substances.246 To issue 
lawful prescriptions of the Schedule II drugs (the category of drugs 
used by Oregon physicians for assisted suicides) physicians must “ob-
tain from the Attorney General a registration issued in accordance 
with the rules and regulations promulgated by him.”247 The Attorney 
General may quash the physician’s registration if he determines it is 
not in the public’s “best interest.”248 The Attorney General looks at 
five factors in determining whether the physician’s registration is in 
the public’s interest.249 The CSA also leaves a role for the states in 
                                                                                                                     
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 911. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 912-13. 
 246. Id. at 911 (“[T]he CSA creates a comprehensive, closed regulatory regime crimi-
nalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of sub-
stances classified in any of the Act’s five schedules.”). The drugs are placed in a schedule 
depending on their potential for abuse. Id. There are five different schedules that act as a 
classifying system with one being the substances with the strongest restrictions and five 
having the least restrictions. Id. The substances in this case fell under Schedule II. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. The factors the Attorney General shall consider are (1) the recommendation of 
the State licensing board, (2) the physician’s experience with respect to controlled sub-
stances, (3) the physician’s conviction record with regard to controlled substances, (4) 
whether the physician followed the law relating to controlled substances, and (5) whether 
the conduct may threaten the public health and safety. Id. at 412. 
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regulating the different substances.250 In 2001, without consulting 
Oregon or anyone outside his office, then-Attorney General John 
Ashcroft issued an interpretive rule finding that using controlled 
drugs monitored by the federal government to assist in medical sui-
cides was not a legitimate medical practice and that the ODWDA 
was unlawful under the CSA.251 
 The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the At-
torney General had the power under the CSA to prohibit the distri-
bution of federally controlled substances for physician-assisted sui-
cide, regardless of a state law which authorized such distribution.252 
The 6-3 Court ruled in favor of Oregon.253 The Court held the inter-
pretive rule passed by Attorney General Ashcroft was not allowed 
within the powers granted by the CSA.254 The Court also held that 
Congress did not intend to alter the balance between federal and 
state governments and that this rule would infringe on the power 
Congress intended for the states to retain when dealing with general 
medical practices.255 
 The Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held the interpretive rule was invalid because the usual constitu-
tional balance between the States and the Federal Government was 
broken by the Attorney General “without the requisite clear state-
ment that the CSA authorized such action.”256 “The Court of Appeals 
held the interpretive rule could not be ‘squared with the plain lan-
guage of the CSA,’ which is intended to monitor only conventional 
drug abuse and bars the Attorney General from making decisions on 
medical policy.” 257 The Supreme Court granted the government’s pe-
tition for certiorari.258 
 The Supreme Court, in affirming the ruling below, began its 
analysis by deciding the degree of deference the Court must grant to 
the interpretive rule’s substantive findings and even more impor-
tantly whether the rule is allowed under the CSA.259 The Court went 
into great detail discussing three cases that have guided how the Su-
preme Court decides what deference to give to an interpretive rule. 
In Auer v. Robbins260 the Supreme Court held there should be sub-
stantial deference given to an administrative rule when examining 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 911. 
 252. Id. at 914. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 925. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 914 (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 257. Id. (citing Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1125-29). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id.  
 260. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
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an ambiguous regulation that was passed by the issuing agency.261 
The second type is the deference the Supreme Court gave in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,262 where the 
Court held an ambiguous statute may also receive substantial defer-
ence “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the ex-
ercise of that authority.”263 The third type is the deference the Su-
preme Court gave in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,264 which held that if 
the interpretive rule does not fall under one of the first two interpre-
tations then it is given no deference and is only given respect in re-
gards to its “power to persuade.”265 
 The Court began to sift through the three types of deference to de-
termine which one should be applied to the Attorney General’s inter-
pretive rule.266 In Gonzales, the Court held the interpretive rule 
should not receive the deference given in Auer.267 Unlike in Auer—
where the Secretary of Labor’s interpretive rule gave more insight to 
underlying regulations that were created by the Department of La-
bor—the CSA in this case merely restated the statute created by 
Congress, and the Court held that the Attorney General was not 
elaborating on one of his own regulations.268  
 The Court next looked at whether the interpretive rule receives 
deference under Chevron and determined that it fails under this test 
as well.269 The Court held that for Chevron deference to be followed 
that the statute must be ambiguous and also the “rule must be 
promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the of-
ficial.”270 In this case, the Court held the CSA did not give the Attor-
ney General power to create a rule outlawing a standard of medical 
treatment and care of patients that is legal under state law.271 The 
Court held that the Attorney General’s opinion is also unpersuasive 
under Skidmore.272 The Court under Skidmore only follows an agency 
rule “to the extent it is persuasive.”273 The Court ruled that case law 
shows that the CSA is only meant to restrict illegal drug dealing and 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 461-63. 
 262. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 263. Id. at 842-45 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). 
 264. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 265. Id. at 140. 
 266. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 907 (2006). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 916. 
 270. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 922. 
 273. Id. 
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curtail when physicians may give out prescriptions.274 However, the 
Act does not intend to regulate the practice of medicine generally, 
and the CSA relies on state governments to regulate the general 
practices of the medical profession.275 The Court also noted the CSA’s 
preemption provision as further evidence that Congress did not in-
tend for the Attorney General to regulate in this area.276 The preemp-
tion provision (which says that unless there is a direct conflict with 
the Act and the state law, the state law should be followed) guides 
the federal government to defer to the state government in situations 
such as the law passed in Oregon.277 The Court also held that the 
CSA was mainly meant to prevent recreational drug abuse and that 
when Congress wished to grant power to the federal government in 
this Act, it did it explicitly.278  
 The dissent began its analysis of why the interpretive rule should 
be granted substantial deference by pointing out the three main ob-
jectives the Attorney General meant to accomplish.279 The first objec-
tive the Attorney General wished to accomplish was to interpret that 
physician-assisted suicides did not fall within the meaning of a le-
gitimate medical purpose.280 Second, the Attorney General inter-
preted the Oregon law legitimizing the use of federally controlled 
substances to assist in suicide to be in direct conflict with the CSA.281 
Finally, those physicians who helped assist in suicides were acting in 
a way that was inconsistent with the public interest, and their regis-
tration could be revoked under the interpretive rule.282  
 The dissent felt that the majority disregarded “settled principals 
of interpretation” and that there were three separate grounds suffi-
cient for reversing the lower decision and finding in favor of the gov-
ernment.283 The dissent then went into great detail discussing the 
three reasons why they felt the majority wrongly decided the out-
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 275. Id. at 923. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 924. 
 279. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Prior to identifying the three main objectives of 
the Attorney General, the dissent provides a portion of the relevant part of the interpretive 
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CFR § 1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally con-
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tered to dispense controlled substances may ‘render his registration . . . inconsistent with 
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 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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come of the case.284 First, Justice Scalia felt that the interpretation of 
legitimate medical practice that was compiled by the Attorney Gen-
eral in the interpretive rule should be granted substantial deference 
under the Auer rule.285 The dissent noted that the straightforward 
rule in Auer applied and declared incorrect the majority’s assertion 
that the statutory language was paraphrased, as the interpretive 
rule clarified ambiguous terms with which there could be multiple 
interpretations.286 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned the majority 
was wrong in assuming that even if the regulation simply cited the 
statute, it did not fall under the substantial deference rule created in 
Auer, because no case law supported that finding.287 Even if Auer def-
erence was not applied, the dissent reasoned that the majority was 
wrong in assuming that the Attorney General did not receive the def-
erence granted in Chevron.288 Justice Scalia accused the majority of 
forcing “term-of-art definitions into contexts where they plainly do 
not fit,” which in turn created a misinterpretation of the powers 
granted to the Attorney General under the CSA.289 
 Second, even if the regulation is granted no deference, Justice 
Thomas felt that the most logical interpretation of the CSA was the 
one determined by the Attorney General.290 He stated that almost 
every source of binding significance supports the conclusion that the 
phrase “legitimate medical purpose” does not include physician-
assisted suicides.291 Justice Scalia said the majority barred the At-
torney General’s decision because the Court held that an executive 
official cannot make a medical practice illegal just because it may be 
inconsistent with one understanding of reasonable medical prac-
tice.292 However, his problem with that finding is that the overpower-
ing majority of authorities (including forty-seven of the states) con-
sider the practice of legitimate medicine to not include assisted sui-
cide.293 The dissent also points out that while the CSA is mainly in-
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 289. Id. at 930. 
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tended to prevent the abuse of substances, there is no reason to be-
lieve that this is its only concern.294  
 Finally, Justice Scalia believed that even if the interpretation was 
wrong, the Attorney General’s independent understanding of the 
term “public interest” is entitled to deference under the Chevron 
case.295 He stated that the Attorney General is explicitly granted the 
authority to register and deregister physicians and that his powers 
in doing so were left in very broad terms.296 Scalia further stated that 
the Attorney General has the power to refuse to register or deregister 
any physician he feels is acting in a manner inconsistent with the 
public interest.297 Moreover, Congress left terms such as “public in-
terest” so broad so that the Attorney General (who is solely responsi-
ble for administering the registration and deregistration provisions) 
can have the authority to interpret those criteria. When Congress is 
explicit in its delegation, Scalia asserted, the Court may not substi-
tute its own interpretation in place of the agency.298 Scalia also noted 
that the majority wrongly found the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to have authority over all “scientific and medical determina-
tions” because, while the Secretary has specific binding power over 
the Attorney General when it comes to “scheduling and addiction 
treatment,” there is no mention of the Secretary when it comes to the 
registration provisions.299  
 Scalia concluded by stating that although making assisted suicide 
illegal may not be within the federal government’s “enumerated pow-
ers,” it has long been practice to use the federal commerce power to 
protect public morality, and this is a circumstance where using the 
commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is necessary.300 Scalia 
further declared that Congress has already tried to do this in the CSA, 
as any real meaning of the term “legitimate medical practice” would 
not include allowing prescription drugs to be used in assisting death.301 
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TORTS—CLASS ACTIONS—PUNITIVE DAMAGES—SMOKERS' CLASS 
ACTION SUIT SEEKING DAMAGES AGAINST TOBACCO COMPANIES AND 
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS FOR ALLEGED SMOKING-RELATED 
INJURIES—Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 31 Fla. L. Weekly S464 (Fla. 
July 6, 2006).302 
 The Florida Supreme Court recently considered tobacco litigation, 
holding in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.303 that the Third District 
Court of Appeal misapplied the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in 
Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co.304 The Third District re-
versed a final judgment for compensatory and punitive damages for 
smoking-related injuries entered for a class of Florida smokers and 
against cigarette manufacturers and other industry organizations.305 
Specifically, the Third District reversed a $145 billion punitive dam-
ages award to the whole class and decertified the class of smokers.306 
The Florida Supreme Court, while ultimately approving both hold-
ings on other grounds, found error with the Third District’s reason-
ing in reaching those conclusions.307 
 On October 31, 1994, the trial court certified the petitioners, a 
class of nationwide smokers and their survivors (Engle Class), under 
rule 1.220(b)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.308 Thereafter, Engle 
Class representatives filed an amended class action complaint seek-
ing compensatory and punitive damages against several major ciga-
rette companies and two industry organizations (Tobacco) for alleged 
smoking-related injuries.309 After Tobacco appealed, the Third Dis-
trict Court affirmed the certification of the class by the trial court but 
reduced the size of the class from United States smokers to Florida 
smokers.310 The trial court issued an amended order recertifying the 
class on November 21, 1996.311 
 After recertification, the trial court issued a trial plan dividing the 
trial into three phases.312 Phase I of the trial considered common is-
sues relating exclusively to the defendants’ conduct and general 
health issues of smoking in order to determine issues of liability and 
                                                                                                                     
 302.  Before this issue of the Florida State University Law Review went to press, the 
Engle decision was withdrawn and superseded on rehearing, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) 
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entitlement to punitive damages for the whole class.313 At the end of 
Phase I, the jury found for the Engle Class on all counts, including 
finding entitlement to punitive damages.314  
 Phase II was further divided into parts A and part B.315 In Phase 
II-A the jury determined the amount of compensatory damages the 
three class representatives—Frank Amodeo, Mary Farnan, and An-
gie Della Vecchia—were entitled to and awarded them a total of 
$12.7 million.316 In Phase II-B, the jury determined a lump-sum puni-
tive damages award for the whole class, awarding $145 billion to the 
Engle Class.317 At the conclusion of Phase II-B, the trial court 
granted two motions for directed verdict in favor of Tobacco,318 but 
upheld all other counts in favor of the Engle Class and ordered pay-
ment of the $145 billion punitive damages award.319  
 Phase III of the trial plan called for new juries in order to deter-
mine “individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each 
class member.”320 After individual liability was established, the court 
would divide the Phase II-B punitive damages award equally 
amongst any successful class members.321 At the end of Phase II, 
however, Tobacco filed an appeal with the Third District, which re-
versed the final judgment in favor of the Engle Class with instruc-
tions that the class be decertified.322  
 The Florida Supreme Court first took issue with the Third Dis-
trict’s application of the doctrine of res judicata under the court’s 
reasoning in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co.323 In Young, an 
association of citizens filed a claim asserting a public interest in a 
private parcel of oceanfront property.324 The supreme court barred 
the citizens’ claim because the city had been enjoined in a previous 
suit from asserting an interest in the parcel.325 The court found that 
“judgment against a municipal organization in a matter of general 
interest to all its citizens is binding on the latter, although they are 
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not parties to the suit.”326 Applying this reasoning, the Third District 
found that the 1997 Florida Settlement Agreement entered by the 
State of Florida and several of the defendants in the case (which set-
tled claims by the state including Medicaid expenses for smoking-
related injuries and punitive damages) barred the Engle Class’s pu-
nitive damages claim.327  
 The supreme court disagreed, finding that in Young, the city sued 
in its “parens patriae capacity, litigating the rights or interests com-
mon to the public at large and thereby representing the citizenry” of 
the city.328 The court distinguished when a state did not sue in its 
parens patriae capacity, holding that “[t]o the extent [the] claims in-
volve injuries to purely private interests, which the State cannot 
raise, then the claims are not barred.”329 Applying this reasoning, the 
court found that as “the State had no right to pursue these types of 
private interests on behalf of its citizens, the punitive damages 
claims settled by the state in the FSA, if any, were distinct from the 
punitive damages sought by the Engle Class in the present case.”330 
The Engle Class’s punitive damages claim was therefore not barred 
by the Florida Settlement Agreement.331 
 Despite the claims not being barred by the doctrine of res judicata, 
the court agreed with the Third District that the jury’s finding of en-
titlement to punitive damages at the end of Phase I was inappropri-
ate.332 A majority of the court, under Ault v. Lohr,333 held that a find-
ing of liability—which requires a breach of a duty, causation, and re-
liance—is required before entitlement to punitive damages can be 
found.334 Phase I of the trial consisted solely of issues relating to To-
                                                                                                                     
 326. Id.  
 327. Engle, 853 So. 2d at 467. In 1995, the State of Florida brought an action against 
several of the defendants in this case under the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. 
STAT. § 409.910 (1995), to recover Medicaid expenses for treating victims of tobacco-related 
illnesses, as well as punitive damages. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S467. Several of the de-
fendants settled with the State by entering into the Florida Settlement Agreement, which 
resolved “all present and future claims against all parties to [the] litigation relating to the 
subject matter of [the] litigation, which [were] or could have been asserted by any of the 
parties thereto.” Id. 
 328. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S467. The court cited interests which were a concern 
to all citizens: oceanfront property, public nuisances, and zoning. Id.  
 329. Id. (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 
1993)). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id.  
 332. Id. at S468. “The last question on the Phase I verdict form asked the jury to de-
termine whether ‘[u]nder the circumstances of this case, . . . the conduct of any Defendant 
rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive damages.’ 
The jury answered ‘yes’ with respect to each of the defendants.” Id. 
 333. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989). 
 334. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S468. “The Third District ruled that the trial erred in 
awarding classwide punitive damages ‘without the necessary findings of liability and com-
pensatory damages.’ ” Id. (quoting Engle, 853 So. 2d at 450). A separate majority of the 
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bacco’s actions and “did not consider whether any class members re-
lied on Tobacco’s misrepresentations or were injured by Tobacco’s 
conduct.”335 As the jury had not determined whether Tobacco was li-
able to any member of the class, a determination of entitlement at 
the conclusion of Phase I was inappropriate.336  
 Furthermore, even if liability for punitive damages had been 
properly found, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously agreed with 
the Third District’s finding that “the trial court erred in allowing the 
jury to determine a lump sum amount [for punitive damages] before 
it determined the amount of total compensatory damages for the 
class.”337 The court stated that punitive damages cannot be outside 
“of all reasonable proportion” to the tortious conduct338 and cannot 
“result in economic castigation or bankruptcy of the defendant.”339 
Furthermore, in recognizing recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, the court found due process limits on punitive damages ex-
isted and that “a review of the punitive damages award includes an 
evaluation of the punitive and compensatory amounts awarded to 
ensure a reasonable relationship between the two.”340 The Florida 
Supreme Court therefore found that without knowing the total 
amount of compensatory damages for the Engle Class, it would be 
impossible to determine whether “a reasonable relationship” between 
compensatory and punitive damages existed.341 
 The next issue the court addressed was the Third District’s decer-
tification of the Engle Class; it found error in the Third District’s 
reason for decertification but ultimately decertified the Engle Class 
on other grounds.342 At the beginning of the trial, an appeal by To-
bacco caused the Third District to affirm the certification of the class 
by the trial court.343 At the conclusion of Phase II of the trial, the 
Third District reversed its previous ruling, finding that the Engle 
Class failed to meet the requirements of either “predominance” or 
“commonality” under rule 1.220(b)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.344 The supreme court disagreed, finding that rule 1.220(d)(1) 
“was not designed to allow a district court to decertify a class, con-
trary to its previous affirmance of class certification and after notice 
                                                                                                                     
court found that an award of compensatory damages is not a prerequisite to finding enti-
tlement to punitive damages. Id. 
 335. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S468. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. (citing Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 
1043 (Fla. 1982)). 
 339. Id. (citing Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1186 (Fla. 1977)). 
 340. Id. (citing State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)). 
 341. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S469. 
 342. Id.  
 343. Id.  
 344. Id. 
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to thousands of Floridians, a two-year trial, and an entry of final 
judgment.”345 The court found that the doctrine of law of the case346 
applied and therefore only a “clear manifest injustice” by its prior 
ruling would allow the Third District to reverse.347 Finding that no 
clear manifest injustice existed, the court quashed the Third Dis-
trict’s decertification.348 
 Despite this finding, the supreme court concluded that “continued 
class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan [was] not feasi-
ble because individualized issues such as legal causation, compara-
tive fault, and damages predominate.”349 In reaching its conclusion, 
the court cited rule 1.220(d)(4)(A), which states that “[w]hen appro-
priate . . . a claim or defense may be brought or maintained on behalf 
of a class concerning particular issues.”350 Finding no Florida case 
law addressing when it is appropriate to certify a class for only lim-
ited liability issues, the court reviewed Federal cases interpreting a 
similar Federal provision.351 The court found that “United States 
Courts of Appeals have concluded that . . . a trial court can properly 
separate liability and damages issues, certifying class treatment of 
liability while leaving damages to be determined on an individual 
basis.”352 Following this reasoning, the court decertified the Engle 
Class, but retained the core Phase I findings.353 These findings would 
then be given res judicata effect, allowing Engle Class members to 
use the findings in individual actions for damages.354  
 A fourth issue the supreme court addressed was the Third Dis-
trict’s reversal due to prejudicial remarks made by the Engle Class 
Counsel, Stanley Rosenblatt.355 The court disagreed.356 During the 
trial, Rosenblatt made several improper arguments, such as compar-
ing the tobacco industry to slavery in an attempt to “incite racial 
                                                                                                                     
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. The doctrine of law of the case “requires that questions of law actually decided 
on appeal must govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subse-
quent stages of the proceedings.” Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 
2001). 
 347. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S469 (citing Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 106) (“[A]n appel-
late court has the power to reconsider and correct an erroneous ruling that has become the 
law of the case where a prior ruling would result in a ‘manifest injustice.’ ”). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (“When appropriate . . . an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”). 
 352. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S470. 
 353. Id. The court did not allow retention on fraud and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claims, which the court stated involved highly individualized determina-
tions. Id. Moreover, the court did not allow the finding on entitlement to punitive damages 
to stand. Id.  
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at S471. 
 356. Id. 
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passions” by appealing “to the jury’s sense of outrage for the injus-
tices visited upon African-Americans in this country.”357 The court 
found that while the comments were condemnable and “ventured 
very close to the line of reversible error,” “under the totality of the 
circumstances,” reversal was not warranted.358  
 Next, the court found error in the Third District’s conclusion that 
two of the three class representatives, Farnan and Della Vecchia, 
were not properly part of the class and therefore not entitled to their 
Phase II-B judgments.359 The class was described as those “who have 
suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical 
conditions.”360 The Third District found that both Farnan and Della 
Vecchia did not fit the class description because they were not diag-
nosed until after the cutoff date.361 First, the supreme court inter-
preted the cutoff date for the class as the date of final certification by 
the trial court, November 21, 1996.362 Next, the court found that de-
termination for inclusion in the class was not when a person was di-
agnosed with smoking-related injuries, as the Third District held, 
but instead “when the disease or condition first manifested itself.”363 
Since the court found that both Farnan’s and Della Vecchia’s smoking-
related injuries had manifested before final certification, the court 
quashed the Third District’s reversal of judgments in their favor.364 
 Finally, the supreme court agreed with the Third District’s find-
ings that the applicable statutes of limitations barred the claims of 
Frank Amodeo, the third class representative.365 Furthermore, the fi-
nal judgments for Farnan and Della Vecchia against defendants Lig-
gett and Brooke were upheld as properly reversed, with insufficient 
evidence supporting their liability for damages.366 
                                                                                                                     
 357. Id. 
 358. Engle, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S472. The court held that context was crucial and the 
court could not consider such prejudicial statements in isolation. Id. Therefore, the court 
found that in the context of a two-year trial, the arguments and comments made by Rosen-
blatt did not rise to the level of a reversible error. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at S473. 
 361. Id. The Third District found the cutoff date for the class to be the original certifi-
cation date, October 31, 1994. Id. at S465. 
 362. Id. at S473-74. The court found that the phrase “ ‘who have suffered, presently 
suffer, or have died’ . . . supports the view that the class should include only those people 
who were affected in the past or who were presently suffering at the time the class was re-
certified by the trial court.” Id.  
 363. Id. at S473. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the Third District court finding that 
since the jury found the plaintiffs were zero percent at fault, the Liggett defendants could 
not be held jointly and severally liable for those damages. Id.  
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 The court remanded the case back to the Third District Court of 
Appeal for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.367 Specifi-
cally, the court approved of a reversal of the $145 billion punitive 
damages award but held that subsequent findings of punitive dam-
ages consistent with its opinion would not be barred under Young.368 
The court quashed the Third District reversal due to Engle Class 
counsel’s improper arguments and quashed its dismissal of judg-
ments in favor of Farnan and Della Vecchia, but it upheld the rever-
sals of judgments in favor Amodeo and against defendants Liggett 
and Brooke.369 Finally, the court remanded the Engle Class to be de-
certified, but it approved of the core Phase I findings, less those find-
ing entitlement to punitive damages for the whole class.370 The court 
ordered that Engle Class plaintiffs could proceed individually, with 
Phase I findings to be given res judicata effect in any subsequent 
trial between a class member and the defendants, provided that such 
action was filed within one year of the mandate of the case.371 
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